(PS4-87) Is It Better for Your Mental Health to Think More Rationally or Less Irrationally?

Abstract Text: Introduction. Is thinking more rationally or less irrationally better for one's mental health? That's the question this study examined in a sample of 550 undergraduates.
Method. We measured rational and irrational thinking with the 24-item Attitudes and Beliefs Scale-2 (DiGiuseppe et al., 2020). Our outcome measures were nine scales measuring psychological symptoms pulled from the Psychiatric Diagnostic Screening Questionnaire (PDSQ; Zimmerman & Mattia, 2001), the Symptom Checklist-90 Revised (Derogatis, 1995), MMPI-3 (Ben-Porath & Tellegen, 2020), and an abbreviated version of the EAT-26 (Garner et al., 1982). We measured symptoms of depression, social anxiety, hypochondriasis, psychosis, and alcohol and drug abuse using their corresponding scales from the PDSQ. We measured hostility and paranoia with scales from the SCL-90-R; we measured Juvenile Conduct Problems with the corresponding scale from the MMPI-3; and we measured disordered eating using an abbreviated version of the EAT-26 (Garner et al., 1982). Hierarchical regression analyses were used to examine whether irrational and rational beliefs accounted for a significant incremental increases in variance of the outcome measures above and beyond the effect of the covariates which included demographic variables (age, gender) and five dimensions of personality dysfunction (Kreuger et al., 2013).
Results. After controlling for age, gender, and personality dysfunction, we found that measures of rational and irrational thinking accounted for an additional 1 to 8 % of variance in mental health outcomes. Irrational thinking demonstrated incremental increases in explained variance in the following outcome variables: depression (R2 = 0.021; F(2, 543) = 20.83, p < .001), social anxiety (R2 = 0.031; F(2.543 = 26.52, p < .001), disordered eating (R2 = 0.007; F(2, 543) = 4.50, p < .034), psychosis (R2 = 0.007; F(2, 543) = 4.31, p < .038), and paranoia (R2 = 0.018; F(2, 543) = 15.20, p < .001). After controlling for covariates and irrational thinking, rational thinking accounted for significant increments of variance in depression (R2 = 0.005; F(2, 543) = 5.36, p < .021), disordered eating (R2 = 0.006; F(2, 543) = 4.33, p < .03), and hostility (R2 = 0.011; F2, 543) = 8.69, p < .003). A measure of the balance of irrational and rational thinking (irrational minus rational) was a significant predictor of seven of nine outcomes (all outcomes except Juvenile Conduct Problems and Drug and Alcohol Abuse).
Conclusions. Irrational beliefs were a significant predictor of more outcomes, but rational beliefs still played a role in some outcomes, and the balance of irrational and rational thinking was a strong predictor. Our measures of thinking were better at predicting internalizing than externalizing problems; a finding which should be replicated. Future research should also include outcome measures of psychological well-being (e.g., happiness, quality of life, subjective well-being) to determine if the same or different pattern emerges when compared to psychological problems as outcomes.